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One of the most robust empirical regularities in the political economy of trade is the
persistence of protection. This paper explains persistent protection in terms of the interaction
between industry adjustment, lobbying, and the political response. Faced with a trade shock,
owners of industry-specific factors can undertake costly adjustment, or they can lobby politicians
for protection and thereby mitigate the need for adjustment. The choice dependson thereturns
from adjusting relative to lobbying. By introducing an explicit lobbying process, it can be shown
that the level of tariffs is an increasing function of past tariffs. Since current adjustment
diminishes future lobbying intensity, and protection reduces adjustment, current protection raises
future protection. This simple lobbying feedback effect has an important dynamic resource
allocation effect: declining industries contract more slowly over time and never fully adjust In
addition, the model makes clear that the type of collapse predicted by Cassing and Hillrnan
(1986) is only possible under special conditions, such as a fixed cost to lobbying. The paper also
considers the symmetric case of lobbying in growing industries.
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and NBER1. INTRODUC1ON
One of the most robust and least discussed empirical regularities in the
political economy of trade is the persistence of protection. Empirical research
by a number of authorssuggeststhat past levels of protection are significant in
explaining current protection levels in an industry. For instance, in their study
of the pattern of protection that emerged in the U.S. following the Kennedy
Round of the GATE Marvel and Ray (1983) found that an industry was more
successthl in resisting liberalization the higher was its level of protection
preceding the liberalization, after controlling for industry growth rates, industry
concentration, comparative advantage, and buyer concentration. Similarly, in
studies of both the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds, Baldwin (1985) found that
industries received more post-liberalization protection the greater were pre-
liberalization levels of protection, even alter controlling for labor force
characteristics, growth rates, and import penetration ratios. In empirical tests
explaining corporations' positions on 6 trade initiatives during the 1970s, Pugel
and Walters (1985) found that the demand for protectionism was strongly
increasing in the industry's initial tariff level, controlling for import penetration
and variables reflecting exporting strength.
This paper offers an explanation for the persistence of protection in
terms of the interaction between industry adjustment, lobbying, and protection.
The story is simple, but the results are quite striking. Faced with a trade shock,
owners of industry-specific capital can respond by undertaking costly
adjustment. Alternatively, they can lobby politicians for trade protection, and
thereby mitigate the need for adjustment. The choice between the two will
reflect the relative profitability of adjusting versus lobbying. In equilibrium, the
level of protection will depend on the intensity of lobbying and on the value
politicians place on lobbying revenues relative to the welfare cost of the
intervention, and will in turn affect firms' marginal adjustment decisions. By
introducing an explicit lobbying process similar to Grossman and Helpman
1(1992), it can be shown that the level of tariffs is an increasing function of past
tariffs. This relationship works indirectly through the adjustment process: since
current adjustment diminishes future lobbying effectiveness, and protection
reduces current adjustment, current protection raises future protection. This
simple lobbying feedback effect has an important dynamic resource allocation
effect: declining industries contract more slowly over time and contract less
than theywould inthe absence of protection.
Several papers have studied protection and lobbying in declining
industries. Hillman (1982) examines political-support protectionist responses to
declining industries by adapting the regulatory capture framework of Stigler
(1971) and Peltzman (1976) to an international trade context. He shows that the
derived protection does not fully compensate specific factors in the import-
competing industry for the adverse terms-of-trade shock. Long and Vousden
(1991) extend the analysis to a general equilibrium Ricardo-Viner framework,
and discuss how this partial compensation result is affected by the degree of risk
aversion of the specific factor owners and by the way tariff revenues are
redistributed. Both papers share the feature that the analysis is static and the
political support function is specified exogenously as a black box.
Dynamic aspects of protectionist policies have also been investigated.
Several authors have analyzed circumstances under which the adjustment path
under protection is socially suboptimal in the absence of lobbying.' In contrast,
Cassing and Hillman's (1986) analysis of senescent industry collapse explicitly
considers the effect of lobbying on industry dynamics. The Cassing, Hillman
model differs from the one presented below in two important respects. First,
the Cassing, Hillnian analysis hinges on an ad hoc tariffresponse function,
which is increasing in the level of labor in an industry, whereas we derive it
See Matsuyama (1987), Tornell (1991), and Brainard (1993). These results
generally hinge on a dynamic inconsistency problem.
2explicitly from interaction between a politician and specific factor owners in an
industry. Secondly, the Cassing, Hillman model predicts that initially resources
will shift graduallyoutof an industry in response to an adverse trade shock, up
to some point at which protection is abruptly terminated, and the industry
collapses.2This discontinuous adjustment behavior is attributable to an
inflectionpointinthe tariffresponsefunction, whichisadhoc.Incontrast, the
modelpresented below predicts asmoothpath of declinein responseto an
adverse shock. Inan extension, we show thatresultssimilar to those ofCassing
and Hillman require an additional assumption, such as a per period fixed cost
to lobbying.
Themodelisdesignedso that it can be appliedsymmetrically tothe
caseof a growing industry. We examine this case in anotherextension tomake
the point that thedisproportionateshare of protection afforded to mature
industries incountriessuchastheUSisbetterexplained bya biasinthe
political processthan bypureeconomic differences.Wealsodiscussthe
implications forgeneral equilibrium.
The paperproceeds as follows. SectionIIestablishesthe central results
in a two-periodmodel of the interactionbetweena trade-impacted industryand
apolitician.Section III extends this modeltoa discrete time, infinite horizon
framework by simplifying the interactionbetweenthe industryandthe politician.
Section IV extends themodel to considerindustry collapse. SectionVconsiders
growingindustries and the implications for general equilibrium.Section VI
concludes.
2Lawrenceand Lawrence (1987)alsodevelop a model in whichlabor
adjustment in adecliningindustry isdiscontinuous. However,thereis no
politicalinterventionintheirmodel. Thediscontinuity is attributable to the
combination oflumpycapacityreduction with monopoly behavior on the part of
labor.
3II. TWO-PERIOD MODEL
We start with an industry that is a price taker on international markets.
There is a specific factor in the industry, which is fixed, and a variable factor.
The variable factor is supplied competitively, and any rents accrue to the owners
of the specific factor. At the beginning of each period t(1,2), there is a
capacity level in the industry, y1. Each period, the specific factor owners choose
to adjust capacity by some amount; (where x>O implies contraction).
Production takes place after the adjustment has occurred. Given the fixed
specific factor input, output is assumed equal to the net level of capacity, q, =
y1-;, whichis also just equal to the capacity level at the beginning of the next
period, yt+1.
Forclarity, we focus on a case with linear demand and quadratic costs.
Brainard, Verdier (1.993) shows that similar results obtain in the general case
under reasonable restrictions. There is a cost of adjustment, ,whichis a
quadratic, increasing function of the amount of adjustment: Ø(xJ=x2/2. The
cost of production is also assumed quadratic and increasing in output:
C(qJ =q12/2.
Domestic demand is a linear, decreasing function of the domestic price
pt:D(pJ=a-p1.In the absence of intervention, the domestic price is just equal
to the exogenously given world price,p,,,,1. We will assume that the international
price is constant over time, with the exception of a discrete jump at time 0.
Prior to that time, both the international price and the domestic price are
constant at Pa' which is consistent with an equilibrium output level, y_°. The
output level is chosen such that the marginal cost of production equals the price:
C'(y,,°)=p0, which implies y°=p0. At time 0, a permanent shock in the
international market causes a decline in the world price top,,<p,. Thus, the
capacity at the outset of period 1, y1= y,°, exceedsthe new long run equilibrium
output level, and the industry must contract in order to bring the marginal costs
of production down to the new internationalprice.
4Adjustment:
In the absence of lobbying, the industry does not receive any protection,
since there are no market imperfections. In this case, its adjustment program
is defined as:
(1)
MAX2172 n(Pyi,x1) +P1t(P_.Y2.t2) wish y2=y1—x,
wherep is the discount factor of the industry, and profits in period tare defined:
w(pypxg) =
Thefirst orderconditionsare:
(2) -"v+ C'1—x1) +p[—p,,+C'(y1 —x1 —x2)] =4/(x1)
(3) + C'(y1 —x1 —xe) =
Ineach period the industry trades off the marginal return to adjustment against





Firstperiod adjustment, x1,isdecreasing in the new international price level, p,
andincreasing in the initial capacity, Yu (which is equal to the initial
international price, ps), with O<ôx1fOy1 ci, which implies that second period
capacity, Y2'isincreasing in y. Second period adjustment, x2, is a decreasing
function of y2, and therefore increasing in the initial capacity, '•Thereis a
negative direct effect of the increase in the world price p_, on x2, which
outweighs the positive indirect effect thmugh the decline in x1, so that a smaller
price shock results in lower adjustment in period two: ox2/ap.c 0. Thus,
adjustment in each period is increasing in the size of the price shock.
5Lobbyin2:
Next we assume the industry has the option of lobbying to influence the
domestic price.The domestic price is the product of an endogenously
determined ad valorem tariff, 0,, and the exogenous world price: p,=(I +0Jp,.
FollowingHelpman and Grossman (1992), we model the lobbying process as a
contribution game where, in each period, the industry can influence the tariff
level by offering a schedule of contributions to the incumbent politician as a
function of the tariff, or equivalently, of the two prices, F(,p1,pj. Given world
price, p, and adjustment, ;,profitsin period t are:
(5) (,'a,a)pfy—x)-C(y-x)-$(x)-Ffp,.p_)
The policymaker values both social welfare, W, and lobbying
contributions in different degrees. We assume that the utility function in period
t is linear in both elements:
(6) G(p,.yr,)=Wy,,xj+(1-)F,(p,,p)
where the weight on welfare, 0,liesbetween 1/2 and 1. Welfare in period t is




where M(y,pJ=D(pJ-(y,-j) is the import demand function. This objective
function is the partial equilibrium, dynamic analogue of that developed in
Grossman, Helpman.3 The most straightforward interpretation is that the
politician values contributions for their consumption value. The objective
function could alternatively be interpreted as maximizing the probability of
reelection at the end of the adjustment period, where the probability is linearly
The welfare weight parameter, a, in Grossman, Helpman is just equal to
01(1-fl) here.
6increasing in contributions and welfare.' In the interests of simplicity, it
ignores a host of interesting features of political interaction, especially
competition between political parties. But,asGrossman, Helpman point out,
evidence that lobbygroupsdisproportionately make contributions to incumbents
and frequently contribute to candidates after they have won suggests this
simplification has some empirical credence.
i. Adjustment Follows Tariff Choice
The timing of the game is as follows:
period I period 2
> > >1 > > >—.l
IndustryGovernment Industry Industry Government Industry
F, Pt F2 P2
In each of the two periods, the industry first chooses its contribution function,
F,, the politician then chooses the domestic price, p,. given the contribution
schedule, and finally the industry chooses the level of adjustment, ;.5
Thesecond period lobbvinz 2ame:
Solving backwards, the industry chooses x2 to maximize r(p2,y2,x2),
yielding the first order condition in (3), which gives x2 as a function of capacity,
y2, and domestic price, p2:
If instead the politician were maximizing reelection probabilities each period,
it would require linking future payoffs to current contributions via the
probability of current period reelection. This would considerably complicate the
analysis.
Qualitatively similar results obtain if instead the government is assumed to
choose a price schedule as a function of the contribution, and the firm then
chooses its contribution and employment level simultaneously.
7(7) x2(Y21P2) =
2
Secondperiod adjustment is a decreasing function of the second period tariff
(reflected in the domestic price level), and of first period adjustment, since Y2=
y1-x1. Plugging the optimal adjustment from (7) into the profit function in (5),
yields the indirect profit function, r(p2,y2) =r(p2,y2,x2'), whichis decreasing
in the capacity, Y2' and increasing in the domestic price, P2
Fully anticipating theindustry'soutput response, thepoliticianchooses
thetariffto maximize G(p2,y2,x2).Thefirst order condition yields an
expression relatingthe marginalindustry contribution to the marginal deadweight




Inorder to induce the politician to choose the domestic price level,p2,thetrade-
impacted industry has to propose a contribution schedule that exactly
compensates on the margin the associated social welfare loss, weighted by the
politician's preference for contributions. The level of tariff protection increases
in the marginal contribution and decreases in the weight the politician assigns to
welfare. When the politician values only social welfare (13=1), the tariff is 0.
The industry chooses its contribution (or equivalently the domestic
price) in period 2 so that the marginal cost of lobbying just equals the marginal
benefit to the industry from increased protection:
(9) ()'22')=dF2(P21PJ2)
Thisis the condition that Grossman, Helpman term local truthfulness. •In
equilibrium, the industry chooses a contribution schedule that satisfies conditions
(8) and (9) and leaves the politician just indifferent between free trade and
implementing the desired tariff and receiving the associated contribution. The




where M2(,p) is the import demand in period 2 and €M(P)isthe elasticity of
import demand with respect to the domestic price.
Combining the conditions for the equilibrium contribution and
adjustment yields the equilibrium price level in period two, p2, as a function of
the initial capacity in that period and the world price:
(11) ______________
(24)—1
Second period protection is an increasing function of the capacity at the
beginningofthe period and therefore a decreasing function of the adjustment
undertaken in the previous period.
The first period lobbying Lame:
Continuing backwards, the industry's first period adjustment level is
chosen taking into account its effect on the level of protection and adjustment in
period two. The maximization program for the industry can be written as:
(12) MAX1 p1(,y1—x1) —C(y1—x1) —4(x1) +pi'(p2'(y1—x1),y1—x1,x)
Using the envelope theorem for the second period profit function and equation
(7), the first order condition for x1 can be written as:
6Theequilibrium tariff can alternatively be derived by restricting consideration
to differentiable contribution schedules and assuming that the industry provides
no contribution if there is no protection: F1(p,pj=O. This assumption can be
justified here because there are no competing lobbies, whereas in the Grossman,
Helpman framework, each industry's contribution includes a constant that is
equal to the difference between its return when it lobbies and when it does not,
given the equilibrium contributions of competing lobbies.





The first two terms represent the marginal gain from adjustmentinperiod 1,
whilethe third term is the marginal adjustment cost saved in period 2 due to
adjustment in period 1. The last term represents the strategic impact of
adjustment in period 1 on the lobbying contribution in period 2. In the linear
quadratic case here, itisequal to zero. Atthe equilibrium,the marginal direct
and indirect returns from adjustment are balanced against the marginal cost of
adjustment in the current period. This defines the optimal adjustment level, x1,
as a function of the initial capacity and thedomesticprice, p1:
14 (P(2++)—ltpX2—1))y1—((24)—l)p1—p$p_ ___________________________
(l+$)((2+$)-.1)÷p$(2—1)
First period adjustment is decreasing in the domestic and international price
levels and increasing in the initial capacity level, with O<ôx,/ôy1 <1.
Combining equation (14) with the equilibrium second period domestic
price levelinequation (11) establishes that the second period tariff is an
increasing functionofthe first period tariff. The intuition is straightforward:
the higher is the domestic price in the first period the less the industry adjusts,
and the lower is first period adjustment the more the industry lobbies in period
two.
Continuing farther backwards, the government chooses the domestic
price, p1, anticipating its effect on the industry's subsequent adjustment and
lobbying in period 2, and taking as given the contribution schedule proposed in
that period. Assuming the policymaker has thesame discount rate as that of the
industry, the politician's optimization problem is:
(15)
Max, G(p1,y1,x1)+pG(p2(y1 -x;);,t1 —x',x2')
Usingthe envelope theorem with respect to the optimal second period price and




In equilibrium, the lobbying contribution in period 1 must balance three term
at the margin. The first term in equation (16) is the familiar static deadweight
loss. The second term reflects the loss of tariff revenue in period 2 due to the
increase in production implied by reduced adjustment in period 1. The third
term is the strategic impact of period 1 protection on the lobbying contribution
in period 2, which is 0 in the linear-quadratic case here.
The industry chooses the optimal tariff taking the politician's anticipated
tariff response as a constraint. Using the envelope theorem, the first order
condition is:
(17) 1(PPYl)
which defines the equilibrium first period protection level as a function of the
initial capacity, y1. Again, the industry chooses its contribution to satisfy the
two marginal conditions and leave the politician indifferent between protection
with the contribution and free trade. Without solving explicitly, these conditions
yield an expression for 8p118y1:
(18) =1_.L') +; 1....?L11_±c.
-
ày1 ày1 ày1a,;81J p1
The first term, which represents the direct effect of the initial level of capacity
on protection, is positive: the higher is the initial capacity level, the higher is
output in period 1, and the higher is the tariff, weighting by the relative
valuation of contributions. The second term, which represents the indirect effect
on tariff revenues in period two, is negative but smaller than the first term.
Thus, 8m/8yiispositive, and protection in period us increasing in the initial
capacity. Moreover, the level of protection in both periods is greater the larger
11is the initial price shock (recalling that y1=p0).
ii. Adjustment Precedes Tariff Choice
In order to clarify the connection between the results from the two-
period game and the infinite horizon framework presented in the next section,
we first show that similar results obtain when the timing structure of the stage
game is simplified in the two-period framework. We simplify by assuming that
the industry chooses its adjustment level and contribution schedule
simultaneously each period, followed by the politician's choice of tariff level.
Starting in period two and solving backwards, the politician chooses the
tariff to maximize G(,p3;y2,x2) given the industrs prior choice of Yz and x2.
The first order condition yields an expression equalizing the marginal industry
contribution to the marginal welftre cost of an increase in the domestic price
level weighted by the relative valuation of welfare:




The industry chooses its contribution and adjustment level to maximize
r(p2,y2,x2)anticipatingthe politician's tariff response. The first order condition
with respect to the adjustment level is identical to equation (3) and the first order
condition with respect to the contribution is identical to equation (9). The
industry chooses the contribution schedule that satisfies conditions (8') and (9)
in equilibrium and leaves the politician just indifferent between protection with
the contribution and free trade. Together, these 3 conditions yield the optimal




12where a=(l-)/(3isthe politician's relative valuation of contributions. The price
is increasing in the second period capacity level and the politician's relative
valuation of contributions and increasing in the internationalprice. In contrast,
the adjustment level is decreasing in the politician's relative valuation of
contributions and international price and increasing in the capacity level.
Continuing back to period 1, the politician chooses the domestic price
level anticipating its effect on future decisions, given first period adjustment and
the industry's contribution schedule. With the simplified timing structure, the
politician's first period first order condition is identical to equation (8') for t= 1.
The industry chooses its adjustment and contribution in period 1
anticipating the politician's optimal choice of tariff and the effect on second
period profits through the effect on capacity. Again using the envelope theorem,
the first order condition for adjustment is the same as equation (13), and the first
order condition for the contribution is the same as equation (17). The industry
chooses its contribution to satisfy both marginal conditions and leave the
politician indifferent about intervening. Together, these conditions establish the





Firstperiod adjustment is increasing in the initial capacity and decreasing in the
politician's relative valuation of contributions and the international price. The
domestic price is increasing in the initial capacity and the politician's relative
valuation of contributions and the international price.
Together, equations (19) through (22) establish that the basic result
remains robust with the simpler timing structure: the level of protection in the
second period is a decreasing function of the first period adjustment, which in
turn is a decreasing function of the first period protection. And adjustment in
13both periods is decreasing in the level of anticipated protection.
Ill. INFINITE HORIZON MODEL
We now extend the model to the infinite horizon case. In order to
derive anexplicit path ofadjustment for output and domestic prices over an
infinite horizon, we maintain the simplified timing structure of the stagegame.
Each period, the industry is assumed to choose its adjustment level and its
contribution schedule simultaneously, after which the politician chooses a tariff
level to maximize utility. This timing assumption assigns greater commitment
power to the industry's action each period compared to the three-move structure,
butthisis offset by the alternating sequence of moves in an infinite horizon
context.
Both theindustryand the politician are assumed to employ Markov
strategies. The state variableisthe capacity, whose evolution is described by
the simple equation:
(23) yt+1 =
Thenthe politician's value function is:
(24) V/y,) =Max,,
Given the relationship between the domestic price and thecontributionlevel
embodiedinthepolitician'sfirst order conditions, theindustrymaximizes its
value function by its choice of contribution and adjustment levels:
(25)V) =Max,,,,[pfy-x)-(y,-x)2 •x,2
With this timing structure and Markov strategies, the politician's
protection decision affects only the contemporaneous levels of the contribution
and adjustment. Therefore, the politician's problem can be simplified to a static
maximization problem. Choosing the optimal level of protection as a function
of contributions yields the same condition on the relationship between the
14marginal contribution and the tariff level as in equation (8').
Faced with this tariff response function, the industry's problem
simplifies considerably, permitting the first order conditions to be expressed as
a second order difference equation. Local truthfulness of the contribution
schedule yields the relationship between the marginal contribution and the
industry's marginal profits in equation (9) (with treplacing2 in the subscripts).
Equations (8') and (9) together with the condition that the industry chooses the
contribution to leave the politician indifferent about intervening yields:
(26) =(p,—j')
a
where y1-y1+1 is substituted for;. Differentiating with respect to the output level
yields:
(27) =—P4'Yt.2(1.$(1 +p))y1,1 —4y,
Combining (26) and (27) and using the initial condition that the capacity attime
0 is equal to the initial price level pa (and setting the coefficient on the larger





where the root is defined:
(29)b(a)
I —ai4(1 +p)—g(l_a)2+2(l_a)$(I+p)4P$l+4ñl p?
24p
and 0< b(a)C 1fortherestrictions on fiadoptedabove, and b'(a) >0.
This path can be contrasted with the adjustment pathinthe free market
equilibrium, which is obtained by setting the politician's weight onwelfare to
1 (a=0):
(30) ye =(p0-p)b(0Y+p,.,
Comparing the two expressions reveals three channels throughwhich lobbying
affects the adjustment path. The equilibrium capacity is higher each period
15because lobbying reduces the rate of adjustment and reduces the cumulative
amount of adjustment that takes place, and these two effects more than offset the
decrease in the coefficient, p0 -pJ(1--a), due to the reduction in the price shock.
The rate of adjustment is slower, and the long run equilibrium level of capacity
is higher, the greater is the politician's preference for contributions relative to
welfare. With lobbying, output is adjusted downward smoothly, at a decreasing
pace, eventually converging to a leveL that is permanently above the efficient
level. The two paths of adjustment are compared in Figure 1.
The —ofthe associated equilibrium tariff can be derived by




The level of protection declines smoothly and gradually with output over time,
reflecting the effect of past protection through the current capacity. Further, the
tariff is higher at each point of time, the larger is the initial adverse shock or
shift of comparative advantage (measured by Wpj• This is closely related to
'the compensation effect' of Magee and Young (1989). The larger the Initial
shock, the more the industry must adjust in order to adapt to the new
international environment, and the larger are the incentives to lobby for
protection to mitigate the need for costly adjustment.
IV. SENESCENT INDUSTRY COLLAPSE
Our result differs markedly from that of Cassing, llilman, who find
that the industry declines smoothly up to some point, after which it suddenly
loses protection and collapses. This result is attributable to the shape of their
tariff response function, which switches from convex to concave at some
threshold level of capacity. By making the tariff formation process explicit, the
framework above makes clear that some kind of discontinuity would be required
16in the industry's Lobbying activities to yield a point of collapse. In particular,
if participation in the lobbying process each period required the payment of a
fixed cost, C, in addition to the variable contribution, then the industry would
lobby only as long as the intertemporal return to lobbying offsets the fixed cost.
Such a fixed cost might be associated with operating an information network,
maintaining political connections, or paying lobbyist's fees.
Recall that with a zero fixed cost, the industry always lobbies, and
adjusts gradually to a level of capacity, p,,J(1-a), above the free market level,
p. Intuitively, the effect of introducing afixed per period cost is fairly clear.
If the fixed cost is belowtheper period return to lobbying when adjustment has
reached its steady state, C<ap2/2, then the industry never finds it optimal to
stop lobbying and receives protection permanently.There is a smooth
adjustment process, whichisidentical to that in equation (28). If the fixed cost
exceeds the difference between the return to lobbying and the free market return
at time 0, when output is at its maximum relative to the steady state value, the
industry never lobbies and simply adjusts according to (30). For afixed cost in
an intermediate range between these two levels, the industry lobbiesand receives
protection for some finite number of periods, t(y0). Up to time i(y0),the
industry lobbies and contracts gradually, cushioned by the resulting protection.
The rate of contraction on this interval lies between that under permanent
protection and the free market rate. At time r(j, it is no longerworth paying.
the fixed cost, so the industry stops lobbying and loses its political influence.
Domestic protection collapses to zero, and adjustment accelerates in a
discontinuous manner.
The appendix proves these results and specifies the relationship between
the time, r,thefixed cost, C, and the other parametersof the model. The proof
proceeds by defining the value function for a single period of lobbyingfollowed
by no lobbying, and then solves forward recursively to determinethe optimal
number. of periods of lobbying before the switch to no lobbying. Thisvalue
17function for optimal temporary lobbying is compared to the value functions for
permanent lobbying and for unprotected adjustment, and the resulting
inequalities define the ranges for the fixed cost relative to the intertemporal
return from lobbying.
V. GROWING INDUSTRIES AND GENERALEOUILIBRIUM
Growine Industries
The case of growing industries may be accommodated quite simply in
the above framework, with rather startling results. Start by assuming there is
no fixed cost. Suppose that there is a permanent price shock at time t, such that
Po rises to some level, p_. In the free market economy, the industry will want
to raise capacity each period, to adjust to the steady state level yp>y0, so
that adjustment will be positive in equilibrium. The analysis of lobbying in a
growing industry is exactly symmetric to the case of decline, as are the
maximizing levels of contributions and adjustment each period. Proceeding
through the same steps as for the declining industry in the infinite horizon
framework yields an expression for the equilibrium capacity in period t:
(32) '1=
(1—a)1(1—a) —Po)b(ar
wherethe characteristic root is defined as in equation (29). When it lobbies, a
growing industry grows more rapidly than it would in the free market, at a rate
increasing in the size of the price shock, and the steady state level of output
exceeds that in the free market by an amount that increases with the politician's
preference for contributions.
This suggests that the empirical evidence that declining industries
receive a disproportionate share of protection in countries such as the US would
be better explained by a bias in the politicalprocess than by pure economic
differences. There are a variety of reasons why the political process may be
biased against growing industries. First, theremay be important differences in
18the cost of lobby formation for fledgling as opposed to mature industries. In the
model above, we simply assume that an industry lobbies whenever the
intertemporal return is positive, thereby ignoring the critical issue of lobby
formation. However, research in political science suggests that industries are
more likely to overcome the free rider problems of lobby formation when they
have large committed resources and established unions. In addition, growing
industries are characterized by rapidly changing market structures and a high
likelihood of future entry, while declining industries are more likely to have
stable market structures with a reduced threat of domestic entry. The greater
risk that future rents will be dissipated with entry may make lobby formation
more difficult in growing industries than in declining industries with clearly
identified players and more predictable rents.
Secondly, in the presence of imperfect capital markets7, liquidity
constraints on lobbying activities may be more binding in a growing industry
than in a declining industry. This would be the case if incumbent domestic
finns in mature industries have more accumulated cash reserves from past
retained profits relative to investment opportunities than do firms in emerging
industries. To illustrate the effect of a liquidity constraint, assume that firms
must finance both investment and contributions from current profits. The






where \ is the multiplier on the liquidity constraint. Since the unconstrained
equilibrium profit level rises monotonically over time, the constraint must bind
Imperfect capital markets mAy exist because either it is not possible to borrow
to finance lobbying, or investors are less optimistic about an industry's future
growth —thanare industry participants due to asymmetric information.
19initially and over a continuous interval, if it binds at all. When the constraint
binds, it affects the equilibrium output only through the characteristic root:
b(a,L=





Thus, i binding constraint lowers the industry growth rate relative to the
unconstrained lobbying path. However, the growth rate remains above the free
market rate, and the long run equilibrium value is the same as that for
unconstrained lobbying. The equilibrium adjustment paths for the unconstrained
lobbying equilibrium, constrained lobbying equilibrium, and unconstrained free
market equilibrium are compared in Figure 2.
In addition, a fixed cost in the lobbying process might create a bias
against growing industries. Suppose, as above, that the fixed cost does not
depend on the size of the industry. If an industry ever starts to lobby, it will not
subsequently stop lobbying, since the return to lobbying never decreases in a
growing industry. Thus, an industry chooses how many periods to wait before
it starts lobbying. If the per period return to lobbying exceeds the fixed cost in
the first period, it lobbies permanently, and conversely if the fixed cost exceeds
the return to lobbying at the steady-state level of output under lobbying, then
the industry never starts lobbying. If the fixed costs lies in some intermediate
range, then the industry waits for some optimal number of periodsuntil it is
large enough that the return to lobbying exceeds the fixed cost, and begins
lobbying.
It is not possible to solve for 1 explicitly. However, by combining (34) with
the liquidityconstraint it can be shown thatb is declining inL and that L is
rising over time under sensible conditions, such that b is decreasing over time.
20Implications for General Equilibrium
These results ignore potential spillover effects oflobbying across
sectors, which is a central consideration in undeistanding the effect oflobbying
on dynamic resource allocation. In a general competition for protection, there
are a variety of channels whereby the equilibrium pattern of protectionmight
result in a diversion of resources away from infant industries towardindustries
with declining competitiveness. The results derived by Grossman andHelpman
(1992) in a static general equilibrium framework, where protection spillsover
between interest groups through consumption,suggest that m2hlresectorswould
gain protection at the expense of infant industries in a competition forprotection
if the infants were less well organized than mature industries forany of the
reasons cited above or if the infants initially were smaller. Similarly, in a model
where there is a limited supply of a common ftctor of production,or the import-
competing sector produces an input used by the exporting sector, the equilibrium
pattern of protection might result in resources being directedaway from the
growing industries to mature industries, distorting adjustment in both directions.
If the distortions were sufficiently great, growing industries wouldgrow more
slowly in a lobbying equilibrium than in the free market equilibrium.
VI. CONCLUSION
Motivated by the strong empirical regularity that the best predictor of
future.pmtection is past protection, this paper has analyzed the adjustment path
in declining industries under endogenous.protection.By introducing an explicit
political objective function similar to that developed in a static framework by
Grossman and Helpman into a dynamic model with convex adjustmentcosts, the
paper shows that the level of tariffs is an increasing function of past tariffs. In
this model, industry adjustment and lobbyingare substitutes: the more an
industry lobbies, the greater the protection it receives and the less it adjusts, and
the less the industry adjusts the more effective it is inlobbying next period.
21Lobbying is an increasing function of the initial price shock, or equivalently of
the gap between the initial level of capacity and the long run equilibrium level.
The paper finds that in the absence of nonconvexities in the lobbying
process, the paths of lobbying and adjustment are smooth. The industry
contracts output gradually over time to a level that is permanently above the free
market level by an amount that increases in the value the politician places on
lobbying contributions relative to welfare. This result contrasts sharply with the
Cassing and Hillman finding that there is a point of collapse, which corresponds
to an inflection point in an ad hoctariff response function. Here, we derive a
similar collapse in the path of protection by introducing a per period fixed cost
into the lobbying function. When the fixed cost lies in a range defined by the
difference in returns between lobbying and not lobbying at the initial level of
capacity and at the steady-state level under protection, the industry lobbies and
receives protection for some finite number of periods and then abruptly stops
lobbying, resulting in a collapse in protection and accelerated adjustment. The
rate of adjustment under temporary lobbying lies between the adjustment rates
under permanent lobbying and no lobbying, and the associated long run output
level is.just the free market equilibrium.
Ultimately, the question of whether adjustment and protection are
smooth or discontinuous is empirical. To the best of our knowledge, there have
been no systematic investigations comparink adjustment paths across industries.
Several articles that investigate a small number of industries do not address this
issue directly. However, our purpose was to investigate the conditions that
determine the adjustment path rather than to establish the validity of a particular
path.
In addition, the paper shows quite clearly that in a partial equilibrium
framework, growing industries will grow faster under endogenous protection
unless there is some bias against growing industries in the political process that
makes lobby formation costly. These results are suggestive for general
22equilibrium, where such a bias in combination with a resource constratht or a
vertical relationship between infant and mature industries wouldresultin a
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TimeAppendix
Assume thatinorder to offer a contribution schedule F(p1,p) to the
politician, the industry must pay a fixed cost, C, in each period. Assumealso
that if the industry does not pay the fixed cost at any time t, then it cannot lobby
in any period after t. We start by defining the value functions of the industry
when it lobbies permanently, when it does not lobby, and when it lobbies for
some finite number of periods and then stops.
I. Definitions and notations
1) Define V0(y) as the value function of the industry without lobbying:
(1) y)nMaxO1sJpz_4_Y22 +pV°(z)]
with z= y-x.Because the function h(z,y) =p_z-r?12- 4.(y-z)2/2is strictly
concave and quadratic, results from Lucas and Stokey (1989) establish that there
is a unique, continuous, and strictly concave value function V0(.) defined on the
interval [O,y0] that satisfies this equation.
2) Further, define V(y) as the value function of the industry with
permanent lobbying on the interval [O,yJ. After optimization on p, this value
function is equivalent to:
(2) V,(y) =Max01, _[y-z]2 —C+pV4(z)1
Thesame result establishes that V(y) is a well-defined, continuous and strictly
concave function on [O,y01. Moreover, V,(y) =V.°(y)-C/(1-p).where V°(y) is
the value function of permanent lobbying with zero fixed costs.
It is also useful to define an operator, T, that associates to any
continuous function V(.) on [0, y0] the new function (TV) defined by:
(3) (T4V)(y)=Max0, [pz—'
_&—z)2-C+pVtz)]
T1V(.) is the value of lobbying in the current period followed by the value
24function V(.) in the following period. It is clear that V(.) is the unique fixed
point of this operator on the set, qo,yJ, of the continuous functions on [O,yJ
(i.e. (TV) =V.).Define [T.]k as the k iterate of the operator T: T.k T
o T o T. ..0 T1.It is well known that for any initial continuous function V on
[0,y°], the sequence of functions ([TJkV) converges uniformly to V(.).
3) In addition, define the two unconstrained" operators, T0' and r,
on the set of all functions from R to R as:
(4) (2'%)(y)=Max EP_z_c_(Y—z) +pV(z)]
(5) (71')(y)=Max ip_z_(12_(Yz)2—c+pV(zj
Again drawing on results from Lucas and Stokey (1989, Theorem 4.14 and p.
95), because the flinctions h(z,y) defined above and h(z,y,a)=p,,,z -(1-a)z2/2 -
arestrictly concave, quadratic in (z,y) for all 0￿a< 1, the operators
T and T', have unique fixed points, V,(.) and V°(.) respectively, defined on
R, which are well-defined, quadratic, strictly concave functions in y. The
optimal adjustment paths z(O,y) and z(a,y) associated tth V0° and V? are linear
and increasing in y, with a slope less than.unity, such that:
- Vy￿p_,
WE [0,1) andV y ￿ pJI-a, p,,,/l-a ￿ z(a,y) ￿ y;
Yy￿p,,I1-a,y ￿ z(a,y)￿ p,.,/1-a.






satisfiesthe fixed point property of V0 on qo,y11] and is therefore equal to V0.
Similarly, defining V7(y) as the restriction of V1° on [p/l-a, yJ, it is a simple
matter to verify that:




V0(.)and V1(.) are therefore differentiable, and using the envelope theorem
yields:
dV/y)= for y c [0, pJ
-(y-z(0,y)) for y e]
(8) and
p_—(1—a)y pw fory e [0, —
dV/y)- 1-p 1-a
-4(y-z(a,y))for y c [..L, 'Q]
Fromequation (8) it is clear that V'(y) > V0(y) for all yE [0, y0], and V,(y)-
V0(y) is increasing in y on this interval. It is also clear that V°(y)> V0(y) on
this interval. Namely, with zero fixed costs it is always better for the industiy
to lobby permanently than not to lobby.
4) Consider the function (T.V0X.), the 1', operator applied to V0(.).
As before, we may consider the unconstrained program:
(tV0)(y)=Mar0 [h(z,y,a)-C+ pV0(z)]
Define z'(y) as the solution of this program, where the superscript refers to the
number of iterates of the T4 operator. z'.(y) is determined by:
(10) z(y) = { zp,, —z(l—a)+(y—z)=—pV°z) }
BecauseV0(y) is quadratic, (10) establishes that for all y in [0, y0], z11(y) is
linear and increasing in y with a slope less than unity. Also, one can verify that
z'1(O) > 0. Then there is a unique point y such that z'1(y) ￿ y if and only if
y ￿y0. Hence one may rewrite (T5V0)(y) as:
26(11) PY_(la)Y_c+PvO(Y) [0, ytfl
(1,V)(y) = 2
(tV0)(v) V Y U';, Y01
It is clear that (T.VO(.) is differentiable, strictly concave, piecewise quadratic
on [O,y01. Using the envelope theorem yields:
(12) (T4V0,)'y) =
p_—(1—a)y+pV0t(yV y c [0, y]
f y yJ
From (4) and (5), unconstrained optimal adjustment without lobbying, z(O,y),
and with permanent lobbying, z(a,y), are determined respectively by:
(13) z(O,y) =z
(14) z(a,y) =(z p_—z(1—a)+(y—z)=—pV4t(z)}
It follows directly from inspection of (10), (13), and (14) and the fact that on
[0,y0] V'(y) > V0'(y) that:
- z(a,y)> z'jy)> z(O,y), for ally E [0,yJ
Hence, pJ(1-a) > y0 > p...Usingthis, and comparing the expressions of
V0(y), (T1V'(y) and V'(y) obtained in (8) and (12), one concludes that:
- V'(y)>(TV4(y)> V0(y) for all y[0,yJ
In particular, we conclude that (FV(y)-VJj) is increasing in y.
5) Now consider the eiterateof the T4 operator applied to V0. For
all t￿1 and allyE(0,yJ, one may construct ([TJV0)(y) recursively, given that
(LTJ4V0)(y) is a differentiable, strictly concave, piecewise quadratic function
on [O,y0]. Let ;Yy) be the solution of the following unconstrained program:
(15) ([t]'V0)(y)Max[h(z,y,a) —C+ p([Tf'V0)(z)J
Then ;'(y) is the solution of the following equation:
(16) {z Ip_—z(1—a)+4S,y—z)=—p([Tf'V)'(z)}
Because ([T.r'V0)(y) is concave and piecewise quadratic, (16) shows that for all
27y in [0, yj, t(y) is a linear, increasing function in y with a slope less than
unity. In addition, z',(O)•> 0. So there is a unique point, y,suchthat z'(y) ￿
y if and only if y ￿y1. Hence, one may rewrite ([T,]tV0y) as:
(17) PJ_(l2a)Yc+P(TJt1v&) Vyc [0, y,]
([T]'V0,Xy) =
([]'V0)(y) ( y ;1]
Usingtheenvelopetheorem,itis a simple matter to see that ([TJV0)(.) is
differentiable,strictly concave, andpiecewise quadratic on [O,yJ and:
(18) ao —(1—a)y+p([TJ'V4')f y[0, y,]
([TJ'Vy&)=
-4(y-zfy)) fy[y,",.vJ
Now we show by forward recursion the following property for r￿ 1:
-;(y)<z1y) < z(a,y)and([TJ"V0)'(y)< ([TJ'V'(y) CV'(y)
forally 6 (0,yjandallt￿r.
Our discussion of(T4V0) showed that this property is true for t= 1 (where z(0,y)
=tjy)with the previous notation). Assume the property is also true for r> 1.
Then it is clear that for all t￿r, y1- < y< p,J(1-a). To show that the
property is true for r+l, we need only show that:
- z'(y)< ;''(y) < z(a,y) and ([TJ'V0)'(y)< ([TJ'41V0)'(y) C V,'(y).
The first part of the assertion follows directly from([T.]"V0)'&) <
([TJ'V'(y) < V,'(y), equation (16), and the fact that ((TjV0y) is a strictly
concave function in y. The second part follows directly from (18).
Thus, the previous discussion establishes:
Lannta 1: For ally E[O,yJ,forall:￿1,
i) The value function (IT] V(y) is dWeremiable and strictly concave.
ii) (IT] V0)(y) -(IT]" V0)(y) is increasing in y.
iii) Cz'jy)C z(a,y)forally 6 [O.yJ and t>O.
28II. Theproblem of lobbyingwiti fixed costs
Weare now equipped to solvetheproblem of lobbying with fixed costs.
In any period when the industry has lobbied in theprevious period, the industry
chooses between lobbyingandnot lobbying. The value to an industry withan
Iflitial SIZe Yoof tperiods of lobbying followed by nolobbyingis simply
([TJ'V(y0). The basic problem thenis:
(A) Max([TJ'V(y)
If the argmax of thisproblemis ,then permanent lobbyingwill prevail.
Otherwise,the industry stops lobbyingaftera finite number of periods and loses
protection.We startbyshowing the following lemma:
Lemma 2: For all y0 > pJl-a,
I) If/or some :￿J, we have ((TJ)Vjy4) ￿ ((Tf')Vb), :henforallk>
0, we also/([TJ1t VJ(y0) C
ii) If/or some :￿1, we have Vjy0) ￿ (1TJVJ('y0), then/or alIk> 0, we
also have Vjy0) C (UJ1VJ(y0).
Proof:
1) Considert1.suchthat ([T.]'V(y0) ￿ ([TJ"V(y0).Since
([TJtV)-([TJ'-'v(y)is increasing on [p', yJ, we concludethatfor all y in
[p.,, yJ, ([T]'V0y)<([TJ'V0)(y). Therefore, as z"(y)>pW fory in [p*,
y0],weget:
(l9([Tf' V0)(y)h(Min[C'(y),y],y,a)-c +p([TJtV0)(Min[4'(y),y])
< h(Min[C'(y),y],y,a)_c +p([TJ''V(J)(Min[4(y),y])￿ ([TjV0y)
Hence,T11 V0(y0)CT: V0(y0). Using a similarargument, wecan show by
recursionthatfor all k> 0 we also have for allyin(pw,yJ,([Tj)V)(y)C
([Tj')VJy). Result i)follows immediately.
ii) Consider t￿1, such thatV(y0) ￿([JrJtV)(y). As V(y)-([TJtV(y)
isincreasing in [p,yJ, weconclude thatforally in [p,y0), V&)C




Hence, V(y0) C([Tj'V(y.Using a similar argument, we can show by
recursion that for all k> 0 we also have for all y in [pW,y41], V(y) <
(fl'j+k%70)(y) and result ii) follows immediately.
Lemma 2 1) implies that if problem (A) has a finite solution, there are
at most two points r and r+ 1< co that can be the solution. Hence, unless Yo
belongs to a set of isolated points y (such that ([TJ'V0)(y)=([TJ'44)V0(y)) there
is at most one finite solution t(y0) to problem (A). Note that Lemma 2 i) holds
for all C>O.
Defining T° as the operator T associated with zero fixed costs, and
recalling that V° is the value of permanent lobbying with zero fixed costs, we
rewrite ([TJV0)(y) as ([F.i' V(y) -C(1-p']/[l-p] , andV1(y) as
V°(y)-C/[1-p]. Temporary lobbying will arise if and only if:
- 3t Ccosuch that ([TJ'Va(ya > V(y0)
or equivalently:
- 3t <co suchthat CI[1-p]>[V1°(y0) - ([T1]'V0)(y0)]Ip'.
It is clear that VJy) < V°(y) for all y > 0. Then by recursion ([T°]'V0(y)) C
V;(y)for all y> 0. Also, since V0(0)= (T.°VO(O) =0and ([T10]V0)(y)-V0(y)
is increasing in y, it is clear that VJ,y) < ([T,°]V0)(y) for ally >0. By recursion
one can also see that ([T1°]'V0)(y) < (tT.0]tVo)&)forall y > 0. Finally, we
can conclude that the sequence of points ([T°]'V0)(y0) is monotonically
converging to V4°(y0) from below.
Let us define= - ([T,°]'V0)(y()/p'.Then the condition, B
co such that ([TJV0)(y0) > V(y0), is equivalent to the condition: 3 t <
such thatC/fl-,,]>u1.
Lemma3: The sequence of pointc (is), is a decreasing sequence (le. u, ￿ u,1
for alit￿O).
30Proof:Suppose the contrary: 3 t such that ti1<u1÷1. Then one can choose
a level of fixed cost C such that u1<C/[l-p]c This implies that at c
such that: ([FjV0Xy>V4(yand([Tj'tV0(y0))<V(y. This contradicts
Lemma 211).
Since it is a decreasing, positive sequence, (uJconverges towards a
limit u￿O. The following proposition guarantees that this limit isstrictly
positive:
Proposition1:If Vjp")>V/f),Le. CCap2/2then thereLv pennanens
lobbyingandpermanent protection. In this case, the adjustment path Lv given
kYy+,=z(a,y.) withthe initialcod Won ye,.
Proof: Given that V4t(y) > V0(y) for ally E [pvt, yJ, V(p) ￿ V0(p)
implies that vy E [p_, yJ, Vjy) ￿ V0(y). Therefore, by recursion,Vy(pV,
yJ, V(y) > ([TJ'V0)(y) for all t￿l. Thus, for all V(y0) >
([TJtV0)(y0), which says that it is always beneficial for the industry to continue
lobbying. Consequently, we conclude that for any y0 ￿ p_/(1-a), there is
permanent lobbying and protection. The adjustment process y1 and domestic
protection p are such that y= z(a,y1.1), and p= p+az(a,y1.j.
A corollary follows directly from this proposition:
Corollary 1: For all: ￿OandallC ￿ ap,,2/2, u> C//i-pj. Hence a =Lint
u ￿ ap,,/2[1-p]>0.
Weare now able to state our main result:
Proposition2:
I)ifthefixed cost C is such then C/[J-p]a, then there ispennanem
lobbying and protection never collapses.
31ii) If the fixed cost C is such that C/[1-pJ > u, then there aists a unique
time r(y0)￿ 0 , suchthat the industry enjoys temporary protectionfor
r(y0)periods. qfier which it stops lobbying and protection collapses.
iii) When protection is temporary, the adjustment path during the lobbying
periods always lies between the free trade and permanent lobbying
a4justnzent paths.
Proof:
I) If C is such that C/[1-p]￿u,thenfor all t, C/[1-p] C u, which is
equivalent to V(y3) > ([TjV0)(y.Hence,permanent lobbying is optimal.
ii) If C is such that CI[1-p]>u, then, because u is decreasing (except in
the case where Yo belongs to a set of isolated points such that ([TJtVa(y) =
([Tj"V(y)),there exists a unique tsuchthat:
=40(y-((T°]'V0)(y]Ip'> C/[1-j,]andCI(1-p]> u =
([T°]'V0)(y0)]/p'.Then for alit'> t+1, ([TJ'V0y)> V4(y0). Moreover, since
thesequence([TJV0)(y0) converges to V(y0), thereis a point,T(Jo)>t,that
reaches the sup ([TJ"V(y0). By Lemma2 thispoint, i(,y, is unique for almost
everyYo >p_J(I-a).Obviously, then it is optimal for the industry to lobby for
r(yo) periods, and then to stop lobbying. Thus, there is temporary protection for
7(J) periods.
iii) This follows immediately from Lemma 1 iii) and the fact that at time
t along the adjustment path, y1+3 =Min(y1,z5(yJ).
An immediate corollary is:
Corollary 2: Jf([TJV0)(y0) .c V/y1), then there L no lobbying and no protection
along the adjustment path.
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